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Abstract Discourses on Responsible Innovation and
Responsible Research and Innovation, in short R(R)I,
have revolved around but not elaborated on the notion of
critique. In this article, generative critique is introduced
to R(R)I as a practice that sits in-between adversarial
armchair critique and co-opted, uncritical service. How
to position oneself and be positioned on this spectrum
has puzzled humanities scholars and social scientists
who engage in interdisciplinary collaborations with sci-
entists, engineers, and other professionals. Recently,
generative critique has been presented as a solution to
the puzzle in interdisciplinary collaborations on neuro-
scientific experiments. Generative critique seeks to cre-
ate connections across disciplines that help remake
seemingly stable objects in moments when taken-for-
granted ways of seeing and approaching objects are
unsettled. In order to translate generative critique from
the neurosciences to R(R)I, socio-technical integration
research (STIR) is proposed as a practice of generative
critique in interdisciplinary R(R)I collaborations. These
collaborations aim to account for societal aspects in
research and technology development. For this purpose,
a variety of approaches have been developed, including
STIR and video-reflexive ethnography (VRE). STIR
and VRE resemble each other but diverge on affective,
collaborative, and temporal dimensions. Their juxtapo-
sition serves to develop suggestions for how STIR could
be modified on these dimensions to better enact gener-
ative critique in interdisciplinary R(R)I collaborations.
In this way, the article contributes to ongoing discus-
sions in R(R)I and in the engaged programme in science
and technology studies more broadly on the dynamics of
positioning in collaborative work.
Keywords Interdisciplinarity . Cross-disciplinarity .
Collaboration . Socio-technical integration research .
Generative critique . Critical Neuroscience
Introduction
The notion of critique has remained underdeveloped in
interrelated discourses on Responsible Innovation (RI)
and Responsible Research and Innovation (RRI).
Whereas the former has strong US policy and academic
roots, the latter emerged as a policy discourse from the
European Commission’s Science in Society programme
[1, 2]. Both discourses speak to the integration of soci-
etal concerns and needs into research and technology
development processes [3–5]. This agenda has been
related in different manners to critique in R(R)I. Van
Lente et al.’s recent paper on ‘Responsible innovation as
a critique of technology assessment’ [6] sparked discus-
sions in R(R)I communities before it was published.
Heated discussions have also revolved around the claim
that R(R)I is itself in need of critique [7, 8], especially in
light of forecasts of ‘the end of RRI’ ([9], p. 253) due to
difficulties of putting it into practice [10–13]. Some
sceptics consider R(R)I as an immunisation against
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public critique of science and innovation [14, 15]. Pro-
ponents, by contrast, regard R(R)I as full of potential ‘to
provide an effective conduit for criticisms and the input
of critical thinking and reflexivity into science and in-
novation’ ([16], p. 64; see also [1]). Along these lines,
some contributors to the proceedings on the Dutch RI
conference series have referred to R(R)I as partly a
‘critical analysis’ ([17], p. 89; [18], p. 71) and ‘critical
reflection’ ([19], p. 357) on scientific practices, assump-
tions, and knowledge [20, 21]. What these different
takes on the relation between R(R)I and critique have
in common is that they are prevalent in R(R)I dis-
courses, but do not specify critique.
Attempts to translate the conception of R(R)I as a
critique of science and technology development into
practice have been made by humanities scholars and
social scientists in interdisciplinary R(R)I collaborations
with scientists, engineers, and other professionals. Dif-
ferent forms of such collaborations have been developed
(e.g. Human Practices, Socio-Technical Integration Re-
search, Toolbox Project, Value Sensitive Design). Ac-
cording to Fisher et al., they have three features in
common [22]. First, they connect scholars and re-
searchers across socio-technical divides. Second, collab-
orators work in close proximity, usually by involving a
humanities scholar or social scientist in a technoscientific
space. Third, they combine knowledge production about
technoscientific practices with contribution to change in
how technoscientific practitioners identify and engage
with socio-ethical dimensions of their work. However,
such collaborations are widely acknowledged to face
challenges [23–30]. One of the challenges refers to the
maintenance of a ‘critical’ position while being immersed
in technoscientific practices.
Social scientists and humanities scholars who report
on this challenge in interdisciplinary R(R)I collabora-
tions shed light on a dual concern. On the one hand, they
are worried that they cannot contribute to technoscientific
practices because they are perceived as adverse critical
observers whose critique is detached from what matters
for technoscientific practitioners. On the other hand, they
fear losing critical distance and turning into uncritical
research assistants. Viseu reports from her experience as
an ‘in-house social scientist’ ([29], p. 643) at the Cornell
NanoScale Facility that her contributions were often read
as ‘critical, adversarial, or ungrateful’ ([29], p. 657). Re-
ferring to her expertise seemed to add ‘unnecessary and
unwelcome complexity to nanotechnology’ ([29], p. 653)
and created distance to her colleagues. Aircardi et al.’s
reflections on their ongoing involvement in the Ethics
and Society Subproject of the Human Brain Project reveal
that they were concerned about their work being reduced
to ethics management. ‘It was important to be clear that we
were not there to do the ethics for them’ ([23], p. 15); they
state to counter associations of their role with service.
Uncritical service and critique that fails to address the
issues at hand sit at opposite ends of a spectrum in the
middle of which humanities scholars and social scien-
tists who pursue an ‘engaged program[me]’ try to posi-
tion themselves ([31], p. 13). The engaged programme
in science and technology studies (STS) bridges norma-
tive and theoretical agendas. It captures the overlap
between what used to be distinguished as High Church
STS aimed at knowledge production and rather activist
Low Church STS [32, 33]. For many STS researchers,
understanding the social nature of science and technol-
ogy is continuous with promoting socially responsible
science. Whereas modest versions of the engaged pro-
gramme address issues that are politically topical, stron-
ger versions, such as action-oriented science studies
[34], interactive social science [35], or engagement re-
search [36], involve active engagement in the fields
under study. Researchers who pursue the stronger ver-
sion of the engaged programme have addressed the
challenging dynamics of positioning themselves in col-
laborative work so as to navigate between armchair
critique and loss of critical distance. Examples are col-
laborative projects with businesses [37], healthcare [38,
39], forensic pathology [40], ICT design [41], or scien-
tific laboratories [25].1
Neuroscientific laboratories, in particular, have
opened their doors to invite humanities sch0olars and
social scientists. They have welcomed those aspiring to
observe neuroscientists for critically deconstructing
neuroscientific practices [43] and those in pursuit of an
engaged form of critique [44]. Some engaged forms of
critique emerged in interdisciplinary collaborations on
neuroscientific experiments, in which humanities
scholars and social scientists managed to walk the mid-
dle path between overly detached critique and uncritical
research assistance [45–48]. Anthropologist Niewöhner
refers to this middle path as a ‘generative mode of
critique’ ([49], p. 13). Borrowing from the work of
Verran [50], he introduces generative critique as ‘pro-
viding different problematisations and different ques-
tions’ that may become ‘generatively irritating when
1 For a genealogy, see Zuiderent-Jerak [42].
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taken back to their respective thought collectives or
epistemic cultures’ ([49], p. 18). As a result, generative
critique opens up possibilities for change in thought and
practice by unsettling taken-for-granted disciplinary as-
sumptions. Unsettlement of what seems to be stable
opens possibilities to draw connections across disci-
plines when approaching an object from points of de-
parture in the neurosciences, humanities, and social
sciences.
Drawing on insights from generative critique in neu-
roscientific experiments, this article develops an ap-
proach to enact generative critique in interdisciplinary
R(R)I collaborations. For this purpose, it addresses the
following questions: (1) What is generative critique? (2)
How is generative critique enacted in interdisciplinary
collaborations between humanities scholars, social sci-
entists, and neuroscientists? (3) How can generative
critique be enacted in interdisciplinary R(R)I collabora-
tions? The tripartite structure of this article follows these
questions to flesh out a particular notion of critique for
R(R)I discourses. This critique serves as a practice for
social scientists and humanities scholars who pursue
interdisciplinary R(R)I collaborations to position them-
selves in-between armchair critique and loss of critical
distance. In this way, the article contributes to ongoing
discussions in R(R)I and in the engaged programme in
STS on the dynamics of positioning in collaborative
work.
In the first section of the article, generative critique is
developed by drawing on Verran and later work that
applies generative critique in the context of interdisci-
plinary collaborations [49, 51]. The second section
shows how generative critique has been enacted in the
neurosciences and how it paves a middle way between
overly detached, deconstructive critique and overly at-
tached, uncritical service. All three positions are laid
out, and examples illustrate how critique has been
enacted of and in the neurosciences. The verb ‘to enact’
highlights that critique is understood as a practice [52].2
The operation of generative critique in the neurosci-
ences serves as an inspiration for enacting generative
critique in R(R)I. Practices for enacting generative cri-
tique in interdisciplinary R(R)I collaborations are intro-
duced in the third section. These practices are well-
established approaches to engagement research: socio-
technical integration research (STIR) and video-
reflexive ethnography (VRE). Both STIR [55, 56] and
VRE [57, 58] are characterised by collaborative inquiry
into practices, decisions, and underlying attitudes of
day-to-day work in research and technology develop-
ment (STIR) and in healthcare (VRE). STIR is juxta-
posed with VRE to make suggestions for how STIR
could learn fromVRE so as to better facilitate generative
critique. An empirical project that is currently in prog-
ress and implements the proposal of this article is
outlined in the conclusion.
Generative Critique
In Science and an African Logic, historian and philoso-
pher of science Verran introduces ‘generative critique’
([50], p. 21) in order to move away from her initial
conclusions about her fieldwork observations in Nige-
ria. From 1979 to 1986, Verran lived and worked in Ile-
Ife where she taught and supervised science teachers in
primary school education. Based on observations in
Nigerian (Yoruba) classrooms, she concluded that logic
and math were culturally relative and that an incommen-
surability separated ‘Western’ and ‘other’ knowledges.
However, she was unable to finish her initial manu-
script, for she felt that it ‘failed to deliver a useful
critique’ ([50], p. 20). Instead of positioning herself as
a removed observer who writes about communities in
which Western knowledge had threatened other ways of
knowing, she revised her manuscript so as to write for
those she studied.3 To develop a critique that is useful
for a bilingual community that struggles with tensions
between Yoruba and Western math in everyday life,
Verran paid continuous attention to what enabled and
foreclosed the recognition of differences to the
hegemonial. When colonial relations define which
knowledge practices are legitimate, a ‘generative cri-
tique’ points at how communities with a colonial past
stay with differences by bringing the hegemonic and the
non-hegemonic together. An example is teaching how to
measure body height as an extension (Western math)
and as a multiplicity (Yoruba math) at the same time by
making extension contingent on multiplicity. This in-
volves asking pupils to extend a string from head to
ground, wind it around a card that is 10-cm wide, count
the number of windings, multiply by ten, and add the
2 On the complex history of critique as a concept, see De Boer and
Sonderegger [53] or Gasché [54].
3 On the politics of anthropological studies on the heritage of colonial-
ism, see Pels [59].
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remaining centimetres of string to the product [60]. The
example illustrates generative critique as a practice that
enacts what might appear as stable objects, such as
measuring body height, in different ways. A critique
that remakes objects springs from creative ways to deal
with tensions between different ways of seeing and
approaching the world. To detect such tensions in ev-
eryday life that may allow for alternative ways of acting,
Verran suggests to pay attention to ‘disconcertment’, a
fairly common but often overlooked ‘fleeting experi-
ence’ ([50], p. 5). It occurs when encountering interrup-
tions that do not fit one’s line of reasoning. Due to their
disruptive qualities, disconcerting moments provide ‘a
sure guide . . . in generating possibilities for new futures’
and, thus, an opening ‘to do useful critique’ ([50], p. 5).
Hillersdal et al. demonstrate how attention to discon-
certment enables generative critique outside of postco-
lonial contexts [51]. The anthropologists pursued gen-
erative critique in Western interdisciplinary research
projects on obesity and high levels of cholesterol in
the blood. They report that ‘sensitivity to difference, as
when sharing doubts with project colleagues about how
to approach a research problem, is a promising starting
point for pursuing a generative critique’ ([51], p. 3).
Sensitivity for the experience of disconcertment helped
Hillersdal and colleagues identify and work through
moments in which the object under study was some-
thing else for collaborators from different disciplines.
Generative critique is making connections betweenmul-
tiplicities of the same object, such as pain as an intensity
located in an individual body and pain as formed in
relation to others.4 These connections gave rise to new
questions, such as what and how to advise people on
choosing cholesterol-lowering drugs. Such questions
also destabilised routine practices, economic and polit-
ically strategic agendas, as well as expertise and evi-
dence hierarchies. Critique of the status quo was gener-
ative of ‘other ways of “seeing and doing” problems’
([51], p. 3) because it was enacted in moments of col-
laboration when problem-solving was unsettled for and
reconfigured with all parties.
According to Niewöhner, generative critique has also
emerged in recent collaborations on laboratory experi-
ments across the humanities, social sciences, and
neurosciences ([49], p. 17, and footnote 71). Strictly
speaking, Niewöhner argues that generative critique
depends on ‘co-laboration’ ([49], p. 10). He admits that
the distinction between ‘co-laboration’ and ‘collabora-
tion’ may be futile because the latter expression has
been used with many different meanings in a variety
of contexts. Therefore, ‘collaboration’ will be used in
this article while presuming that generative critique is
only possible in a collaboration that is co-laborative.
Whereas collaboration usually rests on a shared political
or institutional objective, co-laboration is a shared pro-
cess of epistemic labour, ‘experimenting with different
ways of seeing-and-being-in-the-world’ ([49], p. 10).
Even though co-laboration does not aim at producing
shared outcomes, ‘there is the hope that the participating
fields may change for the better in the sense that the co-
laborative effort will lead to something that can be taken
back to their discipline’ ([49], p. 18). Critique within co-
laboration is generative of possibilities for change. Gen-
erative critique does not depend on the ability to stand
back for revealing the contingency of objects but
operates from within co-laborative practices. Drawing
onVerran, Niewöhner states that generative critique puts
into question how objects have come into being and
how and why they remain stable. Such questions can
arise when people are brought together who are usually
situated differently in relation to an object and, there-
fore, see and enact the same object differently. When
these people co-laborate, they can make connections
between these multiple objects, remake objects in new
ways, and generate alternatives to what is hegemonic in
their situated location. According toNiewöhner, human-
ities scholars and social scientists who enact generative
critique resist the temptations to either loosen their crit-
ical grip because of co-opting relationships or to drift off
to an ‘epistemological meta-level’. He describes the
latter mode of critique as ‘ill-suited for co-laborative
work, because co-laboration with fields requires operat-
ing closely to the relevances and logics of these fields
rather than starting from an outright negation of these
aspects’ ([49], p. 13).
The three modes of critique—generative critique,
loss of critical distance, and armchair critique—have
structured the landscape of critique of and in the neuro-
sciences [46]. In the following, this landscape will be
sketched in order to create a template for critique in
R(R)I. The neurosciences serve as a case study, an
exemplary illustration, that renders the three rather ab-
stract modes of critique more concrete by discussing
4 Kenney elaborates on the relations between Verran’s generative
critique and Mol’s praxiography [61], a research methodology and
genre of storytelling that foregrounds relations so that objects cease
to be singular, abstract, or absolute and become multiple, material, and
mutable [62].
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them within a specific context [63]. The neurosciences
are selected as a case because critique of and in the
neurosciences is considered to be representative of
modes of critique prevalent but unspecified in R(R)I.
Historian and philosopher of science Borck regards
critique of the neurosciences as an example of R(R)I
‘avant la lettre’ ([14], p. 243) because both discourses
combine interdisciplinarity with the ambition to inter-
vene in research processes so as to adjust them from
within. Over the last five years, critique has become
generative in interdisciplinary collaborations in the neu-
rosciences. By contrast, humanities scholars and social
scientists involved in interdisciplinary R(R)I collabora-
tions still seem to aspire for such a form of critique.
Therefore, the neurosciences could provide lessons for
R(R)I to carve out notions of critique, first and foremost
generative critique.
Critique of and in the Neurosciences
The neurosciences are a conglomerate of various disci-
plines: neuroanatomy, neurophysiology, molecular neu-
robiology, neuropharmacology, and cognitive neurosci-
ence, to name but a few. Although the brain is the centre
of attention, these disciplines study the human nervous
system which includes the spinal cord and elements of
the peripheral nervous system, a network that transfers
information about the external and internal bodily envi-
ronment back to the brain. Speaking of the neurosci-
ences in plural reminds us that the field incorporates a
huge range of methods and foci encompassing structur-
al, functional, developmental, evolutionary, molecular,
cellular, and computational studies [64]. Critical voices
in the neurosciences complain that these approaches
lack a unifying theory within which diverse findings
could be integrated. For instance, the terms learning
and memory are used across a range of disciplines
ranging from cognitive neuroscience to molecular ge-
netics, but do not necessarily refer to the same phenom-
ena [65]. According to neurobiologist Rose, the lack of a
unifying theory is partially disguised by a generally
shared commitment to reductionism. It assumes that
the mind can be reduced to the brain—the key to under-
standing ‘who we really are’ [66].
Reductionism has been at the centre of much back-
lash against the neurosciences’ promises of scientific
breakthroughs that constantly require ‘money to be
burned on a massive scale’ but cannot be expected soon
([67], p. 3). Laments over neuroscientific hypotheses
that posit brains as causes for social inequalities instead
of social, political, and economic contexts must be situated
in a broader discontent in the humanities and social sci-
ences. Many facets of human life that were studied for
most of the twentieth century through the lenses of ‘cul-
ture’, ‘identity’, ‘society’, and ‘economy’ have increasing-
ly come to be understood as cerebral functions [68, 69].
The hegemonic neuroscientific discourse about human
affairs does not only rob the humanities and social sciences
of their subject matters but has worrisome societal conse-
quences. Research in support of hypotheses that postulate
depression as a brain disorder shapes subjectivities. Dumit
argues that labels attributed to brain images, such as ‘de-
pressed’ or ‘normal’, are ‘incorporated into further exper-
iments, patients’ lives, and everyday notions of person-
hood’ ([70], p. 11). Labelled images produce ‘depressed’
subjectivities, although one may question the criteria used
to select individuals as ‘depressed’, the variation in images
of ‘depressed’ people, and the technological contingency
of image production.
Concerns about uncritical use of imaging technology,
flawed statistical analyses, standpoint-specific biases,
and other issues have fuelled critique both inside and
outside of the neurosciences. A Nature publication en-
titled ‘Brain imaging studies under fire: social neurosci-
entists criticised for exaggerating links between brain
activity and emotions’ [71] turned discussions among
neuroscientists on dubious statistical analysis proce-
dures into a public event of intra-scientific methodolog-
ical critique [14]. Critique that goes beyond calls for
rethinking scientific routines but questions fundamental
epistemological assumptions has been put forward by
feminist neuroscientists. Examples are studies by Joel
who systematically debunks the assumption that sex
exists as a dichotomous, biological variable in human
brains [72–74]. In addition to neuroscientists’ self-cri-
tique, humanities scholars and social scientists have
engaged critically with the neurosciences. Drawing on
Fitzgerald and Callard’s modes of engagement [46] and
Barry et al.’s modes of interdisciplinarity [75], three
modes of critique are introduced. These modes of cri-
tique are placed on a spectrum, ranging from critique
that is overtly removed from neuroscientific day-to-day
research to a loss of critical capacity on the side of
humanities scholars and social scientists. Generative
critique sits in-between the two extremes of a spectrum;
it is a critique that is enacted in collaboratively conduct-
ed experiments [49].
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Armchair Critique
According to Fitzgerald and Callard, critique is the most
commonmode of humanities and social science engage-
ment with the neurosciences [46]. They present a range
of authors that have published historical, social, and
cultural analyses to uncover biases in relation to social,
political, economic, and epistemic interests and to de-
flate particular neuroscientific trends or claims. As these
authors seek dialoguewith the neurosciences but aim for
dissensus and opposition to change the status quo, their
relation to existing forms of neuroscientific theory and
practice may be described as ‘agonistic-antagonistic’
([75], p. 29). This relation has been established in five
collections and books of critical scholarship published
between 2011 and 2013 [76–80]. In one of these collec-
tions, humanities scholars and social scientists joined
forces and explicitly concentrated their enterprise on the
qualifier ‘critical’ [76].
The ‘critical’ in the name of the Critical Neurosci-
ence initiative preserves ‘historical solidarity’ ([81], p.
362) with Frankfurt School critical theory. It shares with
it a historico-political mission: to reveal the integrated
system of leading assumptions, underlying normativities,
material conditions, and social implications of scientific
inquiry into human reality. By spelling out whose inter-
ests shape scientific research, critical theorists generate
insights that allow them and others to change reality, to
render reality less unjust [82]. In a similar vein, promoters
of Critical Neuroscience follow a dual strategy. On the
one hand, they pursue ‘a multi-dimensional critical inves-
tigation of neuroscience-in-context’ ([83], p. 13) that
reckons ideological influences, biases, as well as hidden
political and economic entanglements of neuroscientific
assumptions. This agenda has been realised in studies that
point to the seductive charm of brain images as direct
representations of disease, difference, and personhood
[84], the troubling relationship between management
techniques and neuroscientific findings [85], the
neurobiologisation of crime [86], and the burgeoning
relations between national security industries and neuro-
science research [87]. On the other hand, they call for
adopting ‘a hands-on approach that embeds and involves
the critic within interdisciplinary research’ ([83], p. 13).
The objective is to render critique meaningful and pro-
ductive for neuroscientific research.
However, Critical Neuroscience has shown hesita-
tion to realise the proclaimed ‘hands-on approach’. Fitz-
gerald et al. assert that Critical Neuroscience has
resorted to armchair critique [88], instead of ‘linking
critique with lab practice to influence the shape of future
research in neuroscience’ ([86], p. 74). Most of the
members of the initiative have not engaged with neuro-
scientists in experimental research, possibly because
their mission is to reposition experiments in their ‘con-
text’ ([89], p. 35). They use context as a knife that cuts
through the black box of experimentation, allowing
experimenters to see the ideological assumptions that
inform their production and dissemination of knowl-
edge. However, if the main weapon is a knife, there
may be no experiment left after it has been sliced up
into pieces. Neuroscientists are left empty-handed, de-
prived of material that they could either rethink and
improve or contribute to an interdisciplinary project.
Such rather destructive armchair critique has pervaded
early critical scholarship on the neurosciences, which is
why reviewers from the neurosciences have argued that
despite calls for interdisciplinarity, ‘bidirectional feed-
back is hardly found’ ([90], p. 82). After reading Ortega
and Vidal’s Neurocultures [79], neuroscientist Mòdol i
Vidal concludes:
[N]euroscience does not treat social issues (at least
with a social approximation, leaving its own ‘re-
ductionist’ perspective) and social [research] does
not make research in the neurosciences (such as
‘neuroscientist[s]’). There is probably, where the
problem lies. ([90], p. 82)
In order to overcome this problem, Fitzgerald et al.
suggest that ‘it may be “experiment”, and not “[social]
context”, that forms the meeting-ground between
neuro-biological and socio-political research prac-
tices’ ([88], p. 1). Such suggestions have also been
raised in recently published scholarship that has con-
tinued the critical trajectory [91–93].Whereas theCrit-
ical Neuroscience initiative has dissolved because
members moved on to other projects [14], their critical
successors rethink the relation between the neurosci-
ences and the humanities. Several contributions to
Leefmann and Hildt’s collection discuss possible
forms of ‘multidirectional’ ([94], p. xii) interactions
between the neurosciences, social sciences, and hu-
manities. In this spirit, De Vos and Pluth include three
essays of researchers working in the neurosciences in
their volume ([91], p. 2). Critics seem to start leaving
their armchairs to enter laboratories and initiate collab-
orations with neuroscientists.
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Loss of Critical Distance
Calls for interdisciplinary collaboration are often accom-
panied by worries among humanities scholars and social
scientists about a loss of critical distance due to co-
optation. Such loss of critical distance can take two forms:
‘ebullience’ ([46], p. 11) or ‘service-subordination’ ([75],
p. 28). Ebullience refers to uncritical incorporation of
neuroscientific claims in scholarship in support of theoret-
ical insights of cultural and social analyses. An example is
work on affect theory in cultural studies that often rests on
‘surprisingly thin, often naïve, summaries’ ([46], p. 11) of
neuroscientific studies, such asMassumi’s ‘TheAutonomy
of Affect’ [95]. Similarly uncritical are scholars whose
collaborations with neuroscientists are characterised by a
hierarchical division of labour. A ‘service discipline’ ([75],
p. 29), often from the humanities and social sciences,
adopts a natural science definition of a problem and sup-
ports the development of solution strategies. Service may
also consist in assessing and generating public understand-
ing of the ‘master’ science ([75], p. 29).
Fear to be reduced to a neuroscientist’s ‘handmaid’
has been prevalent in several humanities-neuroscience
collaborations. Lysen’s analysis of recent work by artist
Antye Guenther and neuroscientist Alexander Sack in
the Brain Stimulation and Cognition group of Universi-
tyMaastricht suggests potentially conflicting interests in
an art-science collaboration [96]. Sack’s research group
studies non-invasive brain stimulation to gain a better
understanding of neural mechanisms underlying percep-
tion, cognition, and behaviour. The group faces difficul-
ties to visualise complex, dynamic patterns of neuronal
activity on which their research is premised. Though the
question of (the impossibility of) visualisation had sparked
Sack’s initial interest in engaging in an art-science project,
this approach quickly appeared not to be satisfactory. With
Guenther’s insistence, both agreed ‘an interesting art-
science project would need to steer away from the tenden-
cy to assign the artist the (instrumental) role of visualizing
science “post-closure”’ ([96], p. 66, emphasis in original).
An instrumental role would deprive Guenther of her crit-
ical capacity to question the epistemology of experimenta-
tion and the ability to define key issues for investigation
during her visits of the research group. Klein and
Marghetis suggest even wider implications of such a divi-
sion of labour, which they have observed in many collab-
orations between performers or performance scholars and
cognitive neuroscientists [97]. Much of this collaborative
work is framed as a ‘friendly symbiosis’ ([98], p. xiv; see
also [99]). According to Klein and Marghetis,
[t]his symbiosis is enacted largely as an exchange,
whereby science provides frameworks, para-
digms, and authoritative weight, and performance
provides vivid and visceral materiality. This has
two related implications: the bodies and practices
of science disappear, while the embodied knowl-
edge of performance continues to be institutional-
ly undervalued. ([97], p. 35, emphasis in original)
Performance and performers are reduced to mute
material and lose their avant-garde critical function of
disruption that reveals and critiques aesthetic, social,
and political norms.
The possibility of losing critical capacity may also be
the reasonwhy Critical Neuroscience has not lent a hand
to neuroscientists in the laboratory. Calls for ‘critical
friendship between human sciences and neurosciences’
([80], p. 3) or for ‘transdisciplinarity’ that draws on a
‘spirit of good communication’ ([100], p. 16) run the
risk of ‘fabric softening’ according to Jan Slaby who has
been a driving force behind the Critical Neuroscience
initiative (e-mail communication, October 8, 2017).
‘Good communication’ may easily convert into what
Fitzgerald et al. call ‘“equivocal speech”—a mode that
is attentive to the things that are better left unsaid’ ([47],
p. 716), such as critical comments that could
jeopardise the publication of a shared result. In order
to guard against silence or moderation of critical voices,
Slaby urged the Critical Neuroscience initiative to re-
main critical in two respects (e-mail communication,
October 8, 2017). First, it must trace the entanglement
of any neuroscientific project with neoliberal interests
and capitalism (cf. [101]) to counter the trend of
depoliticised scholarship in the face of increasing academic
commercialisation ([81], p. 344). Second, it must be ex-
ceedingly sceptical with regard to concepts and methods
that underpin (brain imaging) studies so as to identify
flawed research (e.g. [102]). Slaby and Choudhury call
for a ‘confrontational response in cases of violation of
scientific standards’ ([81], p. 345). Such caution and calls
for confrontation stem from concerns that humanities
scholars and social scientists may become co-opted by
their neuroscientific partners in light of power asymmetries
and institutional dependencies. Slaby is ‘doubtful indeed
whether the humanities and social sciences will ever ro-
bustly benefit from interdisciplinary cooperation with
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experimental neuroscientists’ since he considers ‘most
“third culture” ideas simply bunk’ ([67], p. 3).
Generative Critique in Experiments
Critique that is neither overly detached and agonistic nor
overly attached and morphed into uncritical service
seems to be possible in an ‘integrative-synthetic’ mode
of interdisciplinary collaboration ([75], p. 28). This
mode of collaboration brings together disciplinary ways
of thinking to advance knowledge in ways that would
not have been possible through monodisciplinary
means. However, Fitzgerald and Callard argue that the
rhetoric of knowledge synthesis rests on the assumption
that ‘there is a thing called social science that addresses
itself to one kind of objects; and there is a thing called
neuroscience that addresses itself to another’ ([46], p.
15). This dichotomy renders invisible the ‘rich archive
of crossings’ ([46], p. 16) blurring the boundaries be-
tween disciplines and objects. Psychology and neurolo-
gy, for instance, are entangled because psyche, body,
and environment form a mutually constitutive system
from which no element emerges as origin to be studied
in isolation [103]. Indebted to this stance, Fitzgerald and
Callard propose that neuroscientific experiments can
render these crossings fertile because experiments allow
for ‘digression and transgressions of smaller research
units below the level of disciplines, in which knowledge
has not yet become labelled and classified, and in which
new forms of knowledge can take shape’ ([104], p.
315).5 Fitzgerald and Callard refer to such open-ended
experiments across the sociocultural-neuroscience-
divide as ‘experimental entanglements’ ([46], p. 16).
According to Niewöhner, experimental entanglements
enable co-laboration and generative critique [49].
Experimental entanglements must be distinguished
from the study of experimental practices in laboratory
ethnography which focuses on ‘critically’ exposing un-
derlying assumptions, interests, and constructions of
scientific experiments [106–108]. As a number of STS
scholars such as Lynch, Stengers, and Latour have
pointed out, critical laboratory ethnographies often ‘ex-
plain away’ scientific practices by means of deconstruc-
tion [109–111]. Generative critique, by contrast,
appreciates perspectives and methods from experimen-
tal research. Humanities scholars and social scientists
interfere in and with experimental spaces, materials,
subjects, and instruments together with their neurosci-
entific partners. They collaborate by ‘doing research
together, using texts and tools together, analysing and
writing together’ ([49], p. 17; cf. [112]).
Fitzgerald and Callard present some of their own
projects as experimental entanglements [46], which
Niewöhner refers to as examples of generative critique
([49], p. 25, footnote 71). Fitzgerald conducted an ex-
periment together with Littlefield and colleagues that
connected neuroscientific assumptions about a biologi-
cal correlate of deception, with a humanist tradition
committed to the contingency of ‘truth’ and ‘lie’ [48].
By producing neuroimaging data that unsettled a neuro-
biological distinction between ‘truth-telling’ and ‘de-
ception’, they transformed sociological and historical
critique of neuroscientific assumptions into a meaning-
ful collaboration. Callard directed the Hubbub project,
which comprises several interdisciplinary projects, one
of them on daydreaming [45]. To think beyond com-
monsensical assumptions about how people engage in
and experience daydreaming, researchers with various
disciplinary backgrounds worked together to pursue
daydreaming as a phenomenon, construct, and trope—
a multiple object. Hubbub researchers developed new
ways of investigating daydreaming by combining cul-
tural, philosophical, sociological, psychological, and
neuroscientific accounts.
More recent experimental entanglements establish an
intersection of arts and sciences. Klein and Marghetis,
an ethnographer of science and a cognitive scientist,
draw on performance art and performance studies to
create an ‘experiment-performance’ ([97], p. 17) that
generates alternative ways of rethinking and remaking
an experiment. In the conventional mode of contempo-
rary psychological experiments, experimenters largely
ignore participant feedback and keep all experimental
conditions equal for each subject. By contrast, Klein and
Marghetis remade their experimental design after each
participant measurement in a way that responded to
participant feedback. By remaking the experiment, they
offer a generative critique of mainstream psychology
research that casts responsiveness to study participants
as epistemic threat [113]. Experimental entanglements
that are currently taking shape involve collaborations
with artists, such as the project ‘Experimenting,
Experiencing, Reflecting’ (EER) and the Experiential
5 This conception of experiments stands in contrast with a plethora of
STS research that demonstrates how experiments make nature fit to
prior expectations and experimental apparatuses [105]. However, Fitz-
gerald and Callard draw on Rheinberger’s ideal account of experiments
as open processes that refuse preliminary decisions about outcomes.
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Conference ‘Touchy Subjects’ in March 2020 in Den-
mark. EER is a collaboration between the Studio Olafur
Eliasson in Berlin and the Interacting Minds Centre
(IMC) at Aarhus University that develops open-ended
experiments to explore perception, decision-making, ac-
tion, collaboration, and knowledge transmission.6 The
project calls for new forms of thought and action in
response to contemporary environmental, political, and
societal challenges. It enacts a generative critique of the
status quo—‘deep crises in trust and social cohesion’
[114]—by making efforts to develop narratives and
models for action to navigate the future in different ways.
‘Touchy Subjects’ seeks to critique a normativity of non-
touch that dominates many contexts and relations by
inquiring into multiple forms of encounter and their
generation. For this purpose, the conference organised
by the IMC and the Danish National School of
Performing Art will bring together practitioners from
performance, art, therapy, medicine, neuroscience, and
other fields (www.touch-subjects.com).
The IMC directed by Roepstorff who works at the
interface between the cognitive sciences, neurosciences,
and anthropology is a space that invites experimental
entanglements across disciplines and sectors. The centre
hosts a range of affiliates as well as visiting scholars and
researchers. They are invited to meet for breakfast, week-
ly seminars, and workshops while spending time togeth-
er in an office space suffused with light and glass walls
that facilitates collaboration among colleagues.7 Howev-
er, it can take a long time until experimental entangle-
ments emerge even if neuroscientists, humanities
scholars, and social scientists share a room. Moreover,
experimental entanglements do not come without diffi-
culties. For example, Fitzgerald et al.’s experiment on
‘truth-telling’ and ‘deception’ was characterised by ‘un-
spoken tension and lurking resentment’ ([47], p. 707).
Humanities scholars and social scientists questioned how
the experiment could be fully collaborative although
only one member of the group knew how to gather and
analyse brain imaging data. Furthermore, the open-
endedness of their experimental entanglement gave rise
to gaps between the original idea and the actual experi-
ment. As the experimental design changed, ‘so too, and
not least for Littlefield, did an ambivalence form around
whether the actual experiment lived up to the expecta-
tions of the idea or whether the final design was ulti-
mately an experiment for experiment’s sake’ ([47], p.
708). Fitzgerald et al. conclude that such ambivalences
are part of experimental entanglements, and that good
collaboration depends on learning to live and work with
ambivalence and reserve. To provide guidance for col-
laborating through ambivalence, Roepstorff is thinking
about practices that could support the emergence and
process of interdisciplinary collaboration and generative
critique (personal communication, August 9, 2019). He
emphasises that it is important to strike the right balance
between structure and flexibility. The aim is to develop
practices that open up and guide collaborative reflection
and learning without formalising interactions in rigid
structures that constrain rather than enable generative
critique. Although generative critique has emerged or-
ganically in experimental entanglements spanning across
the neurosciences, humanities, and social sciences, prac-
tices that support its emergence and unfolding still need
to be put forward.
Generative Critique in Interdisciplinary R(R)I
Collaborations
The case study of critique of and in the neurosciences
demonstrates how generative critique has been enacted
in neuroscientific experiments. However, generative cri-
tique in the neurosciences falls short of articulated prac-
tices that could be used across a variety of projects in
support of generative critique in interdisciplinary col-
laboration. This gap could be filled with practices that
have been developed to facilitate interdisciplinary R(R)I
collaborations. These practices range from constructive
technology assessment [115], real-time assessment
[116], visions and expectations assessment [117],
techno-moral scenarios [118], to specific versions of
stakeholder discussion groups [119].8 However, they
are widely acknowledged to face challenges, in particu-
lar a concern about taking a critical stance towards
technoscientific practices that neither slips into agonism
nor subordination [23–30]. Despite challenges, some
practices have been recognised among scholars, poli-
cy-makers, scientists, engineers, and other professionals
as ‘effective’ [120–123]. For these communities,
6 Videos from a first EER workshop in June 2018 are published on
www.soe.tv/themes/experience.
7 The author of this article visited the IMC in August 2019 to gain
insights into how interdisciplinary research is initiated and facilitated in
interdisciplinary centres and collectives.
8 The references serve as examples, for numerous authors have intro-
duced, employed, and further developed these approaches.
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hallmarks of effectiveness are contributions to socially
beneficial change in thought and actions in science,
technology development, and related professional do-
mains [124]. Among the practices that have been pre-
sented as effective in numerous publications are socio-
technical integration research (STIR) and video-
reflexive ethnography (VRE). STIR has contributed to
voluntary changes in science, engineering, businesses,
and municipal energy supply initiatives. These changes
concern research direction, experimental design, team
work, and interactions with other stakeholders, to name
but a few [55, 56, 125–130]. Similar proofs of effective-
ness in healthcare have been achieved by VRE, for
example, increased infection control [131], the develop-
ment of an ambulance-to-emergency department hand-
over protocol [132], greater commitment of nurses to
palliative care [133], and optimisation of interprofes-
sional communication [134]. That said, such effective
practices are presumably but not necessarily appropriate
for enacting generative critique.
STIR and VRE seem to align with generative critique
because they have shown to elicit alternative ways of
acting. However, the service-subordination mode of cri-
tique may be equally conducive to imagine and enact
alternatives to the status quo. An example is change in
healthcare that is initiated or reinforced by hospital con-
sultants who collaborate with clinicians so as to serve a
management agenda.9 To counter such objections, the
following discussion will argue that STIR could be used
as a practice of generative critique in interdisciplinary
R(R)I collaborations in spite of limitations. Afterwards,
VRE is introduced to develop suggestions for modifica-
tions of STIR so as to overcome its limitations in enacting
generative critique. The discussion focuses on STIR be-
cause STIR is well-known in R(R)I communities whereas
VRE is more established in healthcare research. VRE is a
suitable supplement to rethink STIR because the practices
resemble each other in key elements. They both involve
open-ended collaborations between a humanities scholar
or social scientist and other professionals. These collab-
orations involve regular sessions in which work
routines are put up for discussion. The twofold
aim is knowledge production about what goes into
accomplishing these routines while stimulating re-
flections on how competences that often remain
overlooked or courses of action that are taken as
given could be enhanced. The following discussion
shows that these elements are relevant for enacting gen-
erative critique in interdisciplinary R(R)I collaborations.
Socio-Technical Integration Research (STIR)
STIR was developed in response to the 21st Century
Nanotechnology Research and Development Act of
2003 in the USA [135]. The Act required that ‘research
on societal concerns’ was ‘integrated with nanotechnol-
ogy research and development’ ([136], p. 117). To probe
the capacities of nanotechnology researchers and engi-
neers to integrate broader societal considerations into
their work, Fisher developed a 12-week programme. He
tested his programme in what became the first STIR
pilot study in the Thermal and Nanotechnology Labo-
ratory in Boulder, Colorado [55]. For this purpose,
Fisher immersed himself as an ‘embedded’ scholar
([137], p. 216) in the laboratory where he interacted
with numerous researchers, conducted interviews, par-
ticipant observation, and archival research. Over the
course of doing fieldwork, he noticed that researchers
were often already integrating social and ethical con-
cerns into their work without being aware of their own
role in such a de facto integration. He discussed his
insights with the researchers and assisted them in artic-
ulating further latent ethical reflections. To facilitate this
process, he developed what he called the STIR ‘decision
protocol’ ([138], p. 2). On the basis of the protocol, he
engaged with researchers in a collaborative manner to
map out their decision-making processes on a regular
basis. They explored together how ethical and societal
considerations were already or could be aligned with
technical alternatives and how researchers could further
cultivate or bring about this alignment in practice. As a
result, researchers enhanced their capacities for integrat-
ing socio-ethical considerations with technical alterna-
tives and started to perceive socio-technical integration
as ‘an integral part of th[eir] work’ ([139], p. 74). In
addition, they voluntarily altered their decisions and
practices concerning experimental setup, material
choice, and safety strategies [137]. Hence, the STIR
pilot study realised a twofold agenda. On the one hand,
it rendered research and innovation processes more akin
to what would eventually be articulated as R(R)I by
integrating societal and ethical considerations into these
very processes and products. On the other hand, it
resulted in knowledge production about whether such
9 For a discussion on the distinction between ‘uncritical’ hospital
consultancy and ‘critical’ engagement research, see Zuiderent-Jerak
[42].
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an integration is possible in the first place, about how it
unfolds over time, and on how it co-produces ethics,
science, and technology on the laboratory floor.
STIR serves as a practice for generative critique be-
cause it facilitates explorations of alternative ways of
doing research in a collaborative learning process. By
using participant observation as a resource for collabora-
tion on issues of direct relevance to technoscientific prac-
titioners, an embedded scholar avoids armchair critique.
The collaborative nature of interactions helps circumvent
a service-subordinationmode of interdisciplinarity. Ethics
cannot be ‘outsourced’ to an embedded scholar because
what counts as ‘ethical’ and ‘unethical’ unfolds and may
become altered over time in discussions about routine
technoscientific practices. Each semi-structured dialogue
guided by the decision protocol starts with exploring an
opportunity, challenge, or problem that a researcher cur-
rently faces and that incites decision-making. A research-
er and an embedded scholar co-develop a problem defi-
nition, reflect together on considerations that matter for
alternative courses of action, and anticipate outcomes of a
particular course of action selected from available alter-
natives [56]. The decision protocol structures interactions
around four components (opportunity, considerations,
alternatives, outcomes) but allows for flexibility in their
order and application. While some embedded scholars
adhere closely to the STIR decision protocol [127], others
have altered or omitted components, choosing instead to
adapt the STIR dialogue to their collaborators’ concerns
and needs [140]. STIR seems to strike a balance between
structure and flexibility so that generative critique can
emerge in the form of rethinking and remaking scientific
and other opportunities, challenges, objects, and prac-
tices. The interaction between a scholar and a researcher
from different disciplinary backgrounds allows for
connecting and combining different ways of seeing and
approaching a problem, for raising different questions
about it, and for widening the horizon of considerations,
values, and anticipated effects that play into a decision-
making process. While a researcher may alter problem
definitions, objectives, considerations, or practices on the
basis of insights gained in a STIR dialogue, the embed-
ded scholar may also modify her assumptions, questions,
and conclusions about the laboratory environment, rou-
tine work, and its socio-ethical dimensions. Problem
definitions, possible solutions, and insights evolve and
change over the course of a STIR study. Mutual learning
enables rethinking and remaking research and its
objects—in short, generative critique.
Despite the outlined potential of STIR to enact gen-
erative critique in interdisciplinary R(R)I collabora-
tions, STIR could be further aligned with generative
critique on three dimensions that studies informed by
STIRhave shown to be in need of improvement: the (1)
affective, (2) collaborative, and (3) temporal dimen-
sion of interdisciplinarity [24, 28, 137, 140]. First, for
Verran, a starting point in the pursuit of generative
critique is cultivating sensitivity for moments in which
epistemic and metaphysical differences can be experi-
enced.Moments of ‘disconcertment’ ([50], p. 5) render
sensible that tensions between different ways of mak-
ing objects evoke immediate bodily responses, such as
‘the sort of laughter that grows from seeing a certainty
disrupted’ ([60], p. 141). Affect may direct attention to
otherwise overlooked differences, for instance, when
meeting other academic disciplines’ways of capturing
a problem and defining a research object [50]. Howev-
er, STIR has so far not made use of the potential of
affect to broaden ethical considerations and enact gen-
erative critique [140]. Second, studies inspired by
STIR have shown that the realisation of collaboration
in interdisciplinary teams is challenging [24, 28]. Em-
bedded scholars may find themselves outside of scien-
tists’ and engineers’ learning and decision-making
processes for various reasons, including practical, cul-
tural, and institutional barriers [124]. In light of asym-
metric power relations and the possibility of ‘cultural
subversion’, in which ‘one party’s language over-
whelms that of the other’ ([141], p. 660), embedded
scholars run the risk to be cast as ‘spokesperson for
“ethics”’ ([137], p. 225). They may be expected to
operate strictly as experts who evaluate courses of
actions against ethical frameworks and give ethical
advice. Such expectations may complicate a collabo-
rative learning process. Third, aligning expectations
and establishing trust between collaborators so as to
invest in an open-ended process without clear out-
comes may require time [140]. Whereas a STIR study
is conducted within 12 weeks, Kenney describes ‘how
Verran—through decades of thoughtful participa-
tion—attunes her modes of attention, analysis, and
narration’ ([62], p. 750, emphasis added). Capabilities
and conditions that allow for generative critique could
be further nurtured over a longer period of time than the
original STIR study design allows for. To enhance
STIR’s suitability as a practice for generative critique,
video-reflexive ethnography could serve as a source of
inspiration for modifications.
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Learning from Video-Reflexive Ethnography (VRE)
VRE is an engagement research method that was devel-
oped for health service research, evaluation, and improve-
ment [57, 58]. It encompasses two interrelated aims:
academic research and optimisation of clinical practice.
The main principle of VRE is that clinical practitioners,
including physicians and nurses, view video footage of
their everyday work. While watching fragments of their
recorded work practices, they may see aspects of their
work that have become opaque in daily routine. In regular
‘video-reflexive sessions’ ([142], p. 1145), clinical prac-
titioners discuss these visualisations. Some of them have
taken part in selecting video fragments to be shown to the
group on the basis of criteria, such as level of visible
detail, routine and exceptional cases, diversity of tasks,
and relevance to the group. Viewing and discussing video
material together create new ways of seeing and thinking
about daily routines [143]. Clinical practitioners may
become aware of their strengths and weaknesses and
identify possibilities for improvement. AVRE researcher,
often from the humanities or social sciences, facilitates
this process not only by taking care of generating and
selecting video material but also by moderating video-
reflexive sessions. To complete these tasks, fieldwork is
required to develop familiarity with what is going on at a
particular healthcare site, the socio-historical context of
the filmed material, and the institutional environment.
Iedema and Carroll have coined the concept ‘clinalyst’
as a shorthand version of ‘outsider-analyst-catalyst’
([144], p. 176) to refer to a VRE researcher who produces
insider’s knowledge by asking outsider’s questions. A
clinalyst opens up clinical practices to clinical practi-
tioners, who, in return, open up their practices to the
clinalyst. In a collaborative learning process, both gain
access to latent practices that practitioners usually do not
pay attention to or take as given. For example, Mesman
used VRE to shed light on practices that ensure safety at a
neonatal care ward [143]. Assuming that safety requires
more than high technology, protocols, and training to
avoid mistakes, Mesman focused on aspects of clinical
work that go well and are safe. As these are hardly
acknowledged or discussed by practitioners, Mesman
used VRE to explicate practitioners’ hidden competen-
cies to understand the presence of safety in an environ-
ment marked by complex tasks and time rush.
VRE offers inspiration for refining STIR so as to
align it further with generative critique with regard to
the affective, collaborative, and temporal dimensions of
interdisciplinarity. Verran’s proposal to pay attention to
affectively charged ‘fleeting experiences’ ([50], p. 5) has
been taken up in VRE. The role of affect has first been
highlighted in VRE studies as part of a clinical team’s
intelligence. According to Iedema et al., VRE ‘high-
lights and reveals relationships in their affective aspects’
([58], p. 38), but the clinalyst remains an outsider who is
not impacted in the affective fabric of these relation-
ships. Later work has extended the importance of affect
to the VRE researcher [145–147]. A VRE researcher
who works with ‘affect-as-method’ ([142], p. 1148)
develops sensitivity to affective dimensions of field-
work and of video-reflexive sessions to detect moments
of tension at the field site, in video footage, and in its
group discussion. Paying attention to the experience of
‘tacit or visceral impulses’ ([142], p. 1150) may help
identify tension between, for instance, rigid safety pro-
tocols on the one hand and the surprises and hectic of
every day work on the other [148]. The ability to ‘be
moved’ ([142], p. 1150) by what one encounters at the
hospital may work as a driver for a VRE researcher and
clinical practitioners to learn and act so as to accommo-
date tension in clinical practice [147]. Literature on VRE
research that develops affect-as-method could help embed-
ded scholars working with STIR to attend to and engage
with the affective dimension of interdisciplinarity.
The methodological design of VRE could also serve as
a model to modify STIR’s collaborative dimension.
Whereas STIR dialogues usually take place in a one-to-
one interaction, VRE is based on a group process involv-
ing nurses and physicians and sometimes even patients
with their families join video-reflexive sessions facilitated
by a VRE researcher (e.g. [131, 149]). In such a group
process a range of concerns and viewpoints feed into a
collaborative learning process across disciplines, sectors,
and hierarchies (cf. [134]). Clinical practitioners’ authority
and patients’ ownership over healthcare processes have
shown to be perturbed by the video footage of these
processes and by the opportunities, often created by the
VRE researcher, ‘for new questions to be asked, and new
answers to be given, by all involved’ ([144], p. 183). A
VRE researcher avoids being treated as a moral decision
guide by allowing clinical practitioners and patients to
scrutinise her understandings and interpretations. VRE
researchers have rather been casted as mediators between
different interests and facilitators of ‘reflective spaces’
([150], p. 203; [151], p. 33). Their task is to set reflective
impulses and ensure the functioning of collective deliber-
ation [152]. Similarly, embedded scholars could work with
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the STIR decision protocol to facilitate collective deliber-
ation and unfold group decision-making in research teams.
The decision protocol could either be used to reflect on an
opportunity or problem that concerns all team members to
various degrees, or an individual decision-making process
could be discussed in the group. In this way, STIR could
help establish reflective spaces where practices and posi-
tionings of team members are revisited and revised. This
would allow research team members to recognise their
colleagues’ overlooked competencies and ethical reflec-
tions, learn from each other, critique each other in gener-
ative ways, and interact with an embedded scholar as a
process facilitator, rather than as an ethics expert.
According to Iedema and Carroll, the role of a pro-
cess facilitator who establishes and maintains reflective
spaces needs to be institutionalised [144]. They consider
a facilitator’s long-term involvement as relevant for
building capacities among clinical practitioners to deal
with complex challenges of healthcare. Mesman, for
instance, has collaborated with a neonatal intensive care
ward for more than 20 years [143]. Over time, they built
up a relationship of mutual trust and familiarity with
each other’s ambitions. Furthermore, her long-term in-
volvement has enhanced her understanding of clinical
practitioners’ verbal and bodily language, which she
considers as crucial for interpreting their responses to
VRE. She learned to sense when and where filming was
(in-)appropriate. She developed an affective sensitivity
for subtle, fleeting moments of tension that someone
unfamiliar with the ward may have overlooked. One
may argue that decades of collaboration create such a
high level of familiarity that moments of disconcertment
stemming from epistemic difference between collabora-
tors become rare. This may be a reason why other VRE
studies only lasted between seven months and two years
[132, 133]. STIR studies could adjust their temporal
dimension to such a time frame and investigate whether
a longer duration of embeddedness is conducive for
generative critique.
Conclusion and Outlook
Interdisciplinary R(R)I collaborations have embedded hu-
manities scholars and social scientists in technoscientific
spaces where they aim to both study and contribute to
research and innovation processes. To pursue this double
agenda, they must maintain critical distance so as to call
these processes into question without operating on an
epistemological meta-level that misses the issues at hand.
This article demonstrates how humanities scholars and
social scientists engaged in interdisciplinary collabora-
tions with neuroscientists have managed to strike this
balance by enacting generative critique in experimental
entanglements [44–48, 97, 112]. Generative critique is a
‘curiosity about the genealogies and the performativities
of theories, concepts and methods used to represent [an
object]’ ([49], p. 13). It can emerge when attention is
cultivated to the affective experience of differences be-
tween different ways of making an object, different ways
of knowing, and different ways of being in the world [50].
Whereas the affective dimension of difference is hardly
perceptible from an overtly removed position, a loss of
critical distance renders differences invisible. Although
humanities scholars and social scientists managed to take
on a middle position in collaborations with neuroscien-
tists, they shed light on the difficulties of adopting and
maintaining it [47]. To overcome these difficulties and
translate generative critique from the neurosciences to
R(R)I, a modified version of STIR that draws on insights
from VRE could serve as a practice of generative critique
in interdisciplinary R(R)I collaborations.
This proposal makes three contributions. First, it offers
generative critique as a solution for the problem of taking
on a ‘critical’ position in interdisciplinary collaborations
that has concerned many humanities scholars and social
scientists in R(R)I. To capture empirically how STIR
enacts generative critique in interdisciplinary R(R)I col-
laborations, an empirical project is currently in progress.
This project is a prolonged two-phase STIR study in a
neuroscientific clinical trial that investigates the impact of
meditation in comparison to learning the English lan-
guage on healthy ageing (www.silversantestudy.eu). The
twofold objective of the project is to study and contribute
to the integration of socio-ethical aspects in clinical re-
search onmeditation. In the first phase from September to
December 2018, regular STIR dialogues took place with
two PhD students in the neurosciences, a meditation in-
structor and an English language instructor who have been
in charge of the study interventions. During this period,
field notes were taken on the affective dimensions of
participant observation, STIR dialogues, additional con-
versations, and on the personal affective experiences of the
embedded scholar.10 Moreover, the question ‘How do you
feel about this opportunity/consideration/alternative/
10 For first results of the project that discuss the affective dimension of
STIR, see [140].
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outcome?’ was explicitly addressed in STIR dialogues to
inquire into the affective dynamics that feed into ethical
reflections and decision-making processes.11 In December
2018, a focus group was organised to explore how STIR
could create a space for the research team to reflect on
socio-ethical aspects of their work together. The embedded
scholar facilitated the focus group discussion of an ethical
challenge relevant to all team members by following the
decision protocol and mapping their viewpoints, concerns,
and suggestions for taking action. In the second phase of
the project fromOctober toDecember 2019, the embedded
scholar conducted laboratory fieldwork in order to exam-
ine effects of the first phase. The temporal extension of
STIRwith a second phase of fieldwork, the organisation of
a focus group, and the focus on affective dynamics in
STIR dialogues and participant observation are modifica-
tions of STIR in reference to VRE. The empirical material
will shed light on how this modified version of STIR
enacts generative critique. For this purpose, the analysis
will trace how the embedded scholar’s positioning has
evolved over time by focusing on shifts on the spectrum
from armchair critique to loss of critical distance. Along
these lines, both this article and the empirical project
contribute to ongoing discussions on the dynamics of
positioning in interdisciplinary collaborations in R(R)I
and in the engaged programme of STS more broadly.
The second contribution refers to the elaboration on
critique, a notion that seems to be commonplace but
unspecified in R(R)I discourses. The lack of specification
has recently recurred in a discussion that took place in
September 2019 in Leiden during the first event of a
series of international symposia organised on the occa-
sion of the launch of the International Handbook on
Responsible Innovation. A Global Resource [153]. Dur-
ing the event, R(R)I was described as ‘a new paradigm
for innovation, that is both radically critical of and goes
beyond previous (mainstream) paradigms of market in-
novation’ ([154], emphasis added). For some, the quali-
fier ‘radically critical’ may invoke immediate associa-
tions with twentieth-century ideology critique, that is, a
deconstruction of hegemonic narratives, such as main-
stream paradigms of market innovation, to reveal their
ideological and distorting character [155]. However, as
the audience was filled with researchers who have a
background in STS, they probably rather think of
Latour’s diagnosis that ideology critique has ‘run out of
steam’ and his plea for reconceptualising critique as
unravelling the politics involved in making objects and
facts [156]. These two conceptions of critique have di-
verging implications. Whereas ideology critique debunks
and negates hegemonic narratives, Latour suggests to ask
how the hegemonic has come into being and why it is
reproduced—a blueprint for generative critique [49].
However, if we do not explicate what we mean when
referring to ‘critique’, RI as a ‘radically critical’ paradigm
remains ambiguous. This is problematic since R(R)I
communities aim to spread their programmes among
policy-makers, scientists, engineers, other professionals,
and wider publics who may not be familiar with discus-
sions on critique in STS or in the humanities and social
sciencesmore broadly. In pursuit of inclusivity and clarity
in discussions on critique in R(R)I, this article aims to
resolve some ambiguity around the notion of critique.12
For this purpose, generative critique is delineated with a
case study of critique of and in the neurosciences. By
latching on discussions relevant for the neurosciences, this
article makes a third contribution. It does not only translate
generative critique from the neurosciences to R(R)I, but it
also translates an approach to R(R)I back to the neurosci-
ences. It offers STIR adapted to elements from VRE to
neuroscientists who share an interest in interdisciplinarity
and look for practices that facilitate interdisciplinary col-
laborations. Interdisciplinary teams could use the STIR
decision protocol as a group in order to facilitate collective
decision-making on how to (re-)make an experiment that
cuts across the neurosciences, humanities, and social sci-
ences. The decision protocol could provide a structure for
co-defining what counts as an experiment, exploring the
considerations that matter for collaborators in its design,
developing alternative versions to carry it out, and
reflecting on possible experimental results as well as im-
plications. As a result of the experiences with this practice,
collaborators could refine it in order to best fit the team’s
needs. By means of such ‘internal reengineering’ [157],
STIR supplemented by VRE could become a suitable
practice of generative critique in collaborations across a
variety of disciplines and sectors.
11 This question has been part of the initial STIR decision protocol
[138], but published STIR studies have not addressed how reflections
on the affective aspects of decision-making figure into decision-
making processes.
12 Ibo van de Poel called for developing a language comprehensive for
actors outside R(R)I circles during the event on ‘Challenges for Re-
sponsible Innovation’ on the 12th of September 2019 in Leiden that
was attended by the author of this article.
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